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Abstract 
At 10h30 on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious 
cargo: the French President, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian 
Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s 
destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching 
the airport, the President secured its reopening and, with it, the commencement of the longest 
humanitarian airlift in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance 
beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United 
Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and 
enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s great powers.  
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At 10h30 on 28 June 1992, a helicopter carrying the French President François Mitterrand touched 
down at Sarajevo airport, which had been held by the Bosnian Serbs since the outbreak of fighting 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) in early April. Controlling the airport formed a vital part of the 
Bosnian Serb war strategy of strangulating Sarajevo and ethnically dividing its population. In 
making this visit, the President helped to secure the re-opening of the airport for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population. However, this gesture also had implications 
beyond the besieged Bosnian capital.  
  
The visit was also imbued with a sense of historical symbolism, which Mitterrand used to 
highlight the precariousness of the European project. The French President was keenly aware that 
it was in the Bosnian capital on the very same date in 1914 that Gavrilo Princip had assassinated 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand providing the spark for World War One.1 Mitterrand used this potent 
symbol to reify the threat to the project of European union, if the European Community (EC) 
failed to mediate a crisis on its own continent. Indeed, the symbolism of the visit was stark: Europe 
could now allow itself to end the century as it had begun it, at war. However, the post-Cold War 
European security architecture was not sufficiently developed to deal with the disintegrative and 
destructive processes at work in Yugoslavia. Therefore, in lieu of a preferred European defence 
solution, Mitterrand turned instead to the United Nations (UN) because it could incorporate 
Russia into any solution, which would minimise American and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) influence in Europe.  
France’s role in the international community’s diplomatic response to, and management 
of, the wars in Yugoslavia has often been treated as peripheral.2 However, France took significant 
initiatives in attempting to resolve the crises in the Western Balkans and played an active role in 
shaping the international community’s response to events in BiH. France’s engagement with BiH 
is best exemplified by the visit of François Mitterrand to besieged Sarajevo on 28 June 1992. By 
drawing on memoirs, interviews conducted by the author, and newspaper articles, this article will 
begin an important process of reassessing France’s contribution to the international response to 
the Yugoslav wars. To do so, it will focus on this intriguing case study and demonstrate that it was 
a bold act in support of a larger, coherent diplomatic vision for post-Cold War world order. 
 Since the beginning of Mitterrand’s second term in 1988, French diplomacy had taken the 
UN General Assembly’s stronger stance on humanitarian issues as one of its main guiding 
principles.3 Subsequently, the end of the Cold War had reinvigorated the importance of the UN as 
a global forum. The UN Security Council (UNSC), of which France is a permanent member, 
provided the most conducive international forum for France to remain an important global power 
  
in the post-Cold War world. Mitterrand thus aimed to fix the doctrine of military-humanitarianism 
in place as the modus operandi for international intervention in the conflicts of the former 
Yugoslavia. France therefore pursued humanitarian intervention with great enthusiasm in the early 
1990s, believing that it would not only justify its position amongst the world’s great powers but 
that it would also allow it to shape the international framework of post-Cold War security. As such, 
by the end of 1992, France was the largest troop contributor to UN missions around the globe, 
accounting for 10,000 of 60,000 deployed troops.4 Furthermore, France could often be found at 
the origins of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflicts in Yugoslavia through 
negotiation, particularly when European diplomacy was faltering. 
European diplomacy had already suffered a chastening experience in Yugoslavia over the 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in the latter half of 1991. At that time, Germany had been the 
most vocal proponent of international recognition of the two breakaway republics, whilst France 
was convinced of the necessity of maintaining a unified European approach at virtually all costs.5 
Indeed, François Mitterrand wrote to Helmut Kohl on 14 December 1991 pleading that, “We 
must guard the unity of the Community at all costs and particularly Franco-German unity in this 
case.”6 Notwithstanding, the crisis over recognition placed strain on the Franco-German axis at 
the heart of European integration, although Kohl and Mitterrand agreed to disagree over 
Yugoslavia and chose to prioritise the Maastricht Treaty.7 Significantly, it also led to a serious 
European reluctance to engage with the issue of BiH’s future, which was looming large on the 
horizon. Nevertheless, Europe still led the international diplomatic efforts aimed at mediating the 
Yugoslav crises until the convocation of the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia 
in August 1992.  
In the meantime, Europe’s diplomacy was being led by the seasoned Portuguese diplomat 
José Cutileiro under the auspices of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). 
Cutileiro had drafted a proposal for BiH that confederalised the republic into a tripartite state 
divided along ethnic lines, which, Josip Glaurdić has argued, induced the three Bosnian 
  
communities “to create new ethnic realities on the ground.”8 In anticipation of the European 
Community (EC)’s recognition of an independent and sovereign BiH on 6 April, fighting broke 
out in Yugoslavia’s most ethnically heterogeneous republic in early April. As the descent into 
violence began, the Community called for an immediate ceasefire and sent a strong warning that, 
“Violations of the principle of territorial integrity will not be tolerated and will not be without 
consequences for the future relations between the EC and those who will be held responsible.”9 
As had been the case in December 1991, over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the war in 
BiH quickly became marked by Franco-German discord.  
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher supported US calls to suspend 
Yugoslavia from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) unless the 
Federal Republic adopted a fundamentally different attitude towards the UN, the CSCE, and the 
ECCY.10 The French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas moved quickly to exclude France and the 
EC from this condemnation, as he thought that the EC had already given Serbia sufficient warning 
and he stressed that it was essential to “look towards dialogue, appeasement and a ceasefire.”11 
This Franco-German divergence reflected broader disagreements over how best to develop 
Europe’s new security architecture in the spring and summer of 1992 and how to define each 
international organisation’s competencies. On one hand, Germany was a key supporter of the 
CSCE and consistently sought to broaden and deepen its competencies.12 France, on the other 
hand, was invested in developing a European defence identity free from US pressure. The 
confused and contradictory message emerging from the different and, at times, competing 
institutions highlighted the ambiguity of Europe’s post-Cold War security. 
In this context, France moved to act in support of its military-humanitarian doctrine. On 
22 April, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, announced that France would send aid and 
medicine to the civilian population of BiH and would implement a humanitarian airlift. He argued 
that, “the United Nations must hurry to intervene in order to avoid a greater evil and a new disaster 
caused by a conflict that increasingly resembles a civil war.”13 To lead these efforts, France had the 
  
perfect figurehead in the young and energetic humanitarianist, Bernard Kouchner. A rising star in 
French politics and the French public’s most trusted politician, the Minister for Health had begun 
to occupy a central role within the Mitterrand administration.14 The young minister, who was a 
great proponent of the ‘right to intervene’, lobbied his colleagues in Cabinet to “do something” 
for Sarajevo.15 On 23 April, Kouchner accompanied a delivery of 25 tonnes of aid and medicines 
to Sarajevo and championed the idea of a humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the 
UN. 16  Simultaneously, French Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Équilibre and 
Pharmiciens sans frontières (PSF) were establishing a logistical base in the Bosnian capital in 
collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and EC observers. 17  The 
infrastructure for a humanitarian intervention with a French imprint was slowly being established 
in BiH.  
In support of these efforts, Dumas, alongside his German and Polish counterparts, issued 
a communiqué calling for an emergency meeting of the UNSC and the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force to re-establish peace. The weight of a joint Franco-German proposal forced 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – who was initially opposed to UN involvement in 
BiH – to announce that the UN was ready to act in BiH.18 In support of France’s predisposition 
for European solutions to European problems, Dumas began to explore the possibility of the EC 
or Western European Union (WEU) dispatching observers to BiH under a UN mandate.19 Dumas 
proposed sending an observation mission to BiH under the leadership of Marrack Goulding, head 
of peacekeeping operations for the UN. Boutros-Ghali acquiesced and dispatched Goulding to 
the Bosnian capital to study the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping operation.20 However, 
following a fraught incident involving a UN exchange convoy that was transporting Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegović, it became clear that the UN presence in Sarajevo was neither 
sufficiently equipped nor mandated to deal with the evolving crisis. By 15 May, UN Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) Commander Satish Nambiar decided to withdraw the force from Sarajevo, 
leaving behind a small contingent of French peacekeepers.21 Equally, following the death of a 
  
Belgian EC observer, the EC reduced its presence in Sarajevo and its personnel were withdrawn 
from Bihać, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Mostar.22 In spite of French activism and enthusiasm, the EC-
UN tandem was faltering and with it France’s vision. 
As the Europeans withdrew their ambassadors from Belgrade and pushed for sanctions 
against the newly-created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), France continued to insist on the 
necessity of sending a UN deployment to BiH. Daniel Bernard, Spokesman for the Quai d’Orsay, 
announced that, France was “thinking of a small contingent of a few hundred men, mandated by 
the UN and drawn from European forces… to perform basic and essential humanitarian tasks, 
such as the protection of humanitarian convoys, airport access and the protection of negotiators.”23 
In light of this French initiative, the UNSC called on the Secretary General to prepare a study on 
the feasibility of humanitarian intervention along France’s proposed lines.24 Although Boutros-
Ghali remained reluctant to deepen the UN’s involvement in BiH, the Quai d’Orsay thought that 
the UNSC was “going in the right direction”.25 However, this progress was asynchronous to the 
acceleration of events on the ground and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
described the Bosnian War as “without doubt the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the Second 
World War.”26 In light of this, and the lack of progress made in finding a political solution to the 
crisis, France was becoming increasingly dismayed with the efforts of the ECCY. The Quai d’Orsay 
thus called on the UN to convene a meeting between the warring parties at its headquarters in 
Geneva.27 However, the Secretary General’s reticence won out and he continued to champion the 
work of the ECCY.28 Notwithstanding UN reluctance, France continued to enthusiastically engage 
with the Bosnian question and attempt to offer European leadership.  
The Europeans’ failure to mediate the crisis led United States Secretary of State James 
Baker to declare that his country would not rule out military action against Serbia if political, 
economic, and diplomatic sanctions failed to bring Belgrade to heel. 29  With the Europeans 
struggling to agree on a sanctions policy, France and Germany clashed over the speed and strength 
over the penalties against Belgrade.30 France was reluctant to pursue sanctions, believing that a 
  
resolution of the crisis would have to be political and that Belgrade’s cooperation was therefore 
necessary. Pierre Morel, diplomatic adviser to the President, counselled Mitterrand ahead of a tête-
à-tête with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, writing in a note that, “we prefer to avoid entering 
into the system of sanctions which seems to offer little promise because it will not stop the 
fighting.”31 However France was out of step with is European partners as, at a meeting in Lisbon, 
ten countries were in favour of immediate sanctions against FRY whilst France expressed its 
reservations.32 The EC adopted a commercial embargo against FRY on 27 May and diplomatic 
sanctions on 2 June; the UN followed suit a day later.33 However, the EC sanctions did little to 
dissuade Bosnian Serb aggression and on 28 May the shelling of a breadline in Sarajevo killed 16 
people, which led to the suspension of the ECCY.34  
The latest atrocity only highlighted that international condemnation and sanctions offered 
little deterrence to the Bosnian Serbs’ war project. Therefore, the Bosnian Foreign Minister, Haris 
Silajdžić, called for military intervention in light of the single bloodiest attack on the capital and 
complained that, “the UN sanctions against the Serb-Montenegrin Yugoslav republic have 
changed nothing.”35 However, military intervention seemed a distant prospect, as a Pentagon 
official reported that, ‘No one is pushing the military option very hard at this point… At the 
moment the emphasis is trying to get as much international and economic support to pressure the 
Serbs.’36 
By the end of May 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had largely established the principal elements 
of the siege: to physically separate the Bosnian capital from the outside world; to unpredictably 
and intermittently shell the city and its inhabitants; and to carry out the physical separation of the 
city’s population along ethnic lines.37 Controlling the airport and preventing the distribution of 
humanitarian aid was therefore a key aim of the Bosnian Serbs’ siege strategy. Acknowledging that 
the situation had continued to deteriorate, the UNSC deplored that conditions had “not yet been 
established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and 
secure access to and from Sarajevo and other airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 38  The 
  
humanitarian plight of the Sarajevan population fixed the world’s gaze on the besieged capital and 
strengthened calls for direct military intervention.  
On 3 June, Haris Silajdžić appealed to the international community to provide military 
protection to humanitarian convoys and to protect Bosnian airspace.39 The following day, Silajdžić 
met with Dumas in Paris and appealed to his French counterpart to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population. The Quai d’Orsay indicated that there were obstacles 
preventing the functioning of the airport and, thus, the delivery of humanitarian aid, which France 
was keen to see resolved. Therefore, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Serge 
Boidevaix, met with Slobodan Milošević to secure Belgrade’s agreement with UNSCR 752 and 
757.40 Resolution 752 demanded that all parties respect the ceasefire agreed on 12 May, and 
ordered the cessation of military interference by forces from outside BiH, and the dissolution of 
all irregular units.41 With the UNSC’s appeal going unheard, they reiterated their demands and 
implemented sanctions against FRY with UNSCR 757. 42  Of course, having established the 
principle elements of the Siege, the Bosnian Serbs could now accommodate the demands of the 
international community in the hope of forestalling any stronger intervention. Indeed, the UN 
confirmed that it would consider Belgrade’s cooperation in reopening the airport as a 
demonstration of its goodwill.43  
Nonetheless, it still remained incredibly difficult to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
An unsuccessful attempt to deliver aid led Kouchner to declare that it was “necessary to break the 
encirclement of Sarajevo airport and to bring food and medicine there.”44 Increasingly, the public 
and political gaze became fixed upon Sarajevo airport as a panacea for BiH’s humanitarian woes 
and accordingly the credibility of European diplomacy and UN intervention became increasingly 
attached to this issue. However, at an international level, politicians remained divided on the best 
course of action for BiH. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons 
that, “While people see destruction and massacre night after night, they do not expect us to send 
in troops but to take sensible action to bring the suffering to an end.”45 The Portuguese Prime 
  
Minister Aníbal Cavacao Silva argued that military intervention might be necessary if sanctions 
failed, whilst the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, suggested that military should not be 
ruled out as a last resort.46 Kinkel also relayed the American position following a conversation with 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger: “We [the German delegation] had the 
impression that the American side strongly supported sanctions, not excluding military actions, 
but practically that is hardly thinkable.” 47  President Bush reinforced this stance in a news 
conference at the White House stating that, ‘I think prudence and caution prevents military actions. 
If I decide to change my mind on that, I’ll do it in an inclusive way, but at this juncture I want to 
stay with these sanctions.’48 
With Sarajevo quickly becoming “the most famous place in the world”, and international 
public opinion clamouring for greater activism, Boutros-Ghali reported back to the Security 
Council about the prospect of sending a peacekeeping presence to protect the airport. 49 
Accordingly, the UNSC passed resolution 758 on 8 June, which called on all parties to “create 
immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies… 
including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport.”50 The 
resolution also noted that all parties had agreed to “the reopening of Sarajevo airport for 
humanitarian purposes, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, and with the 
assistance of the United Nations Protection Force.”51 Analysts on the ground in Sarajevo reported 
that “reopening the airport would be a strategic disaster for the Serbian forces who now control 
it.”52 However, resolution 758 required “an effective and durable ceasefire” before it could be 
enacted.53 France quickly expressed its support for the resolution and its readiness to contribute 
to the peacekeeping force to be deployed in Sarajevo. A spokesman for the Quai d’Orsay noted 
that the “resolution corresponds to France’s wishes for a long time to see Sarajevo airport cleared 
to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief needed by the population.”54 UN resolutions related to 
BiH had enshrined the importance of humanitarian aid and airport access, and had thus begun to 
fix France’s military-humanitarianism as the international community’s approach. 
  
The Bosnian government felt that the UN resolution was insufficient and instead preferred 
unilateral American intervention. On 8 June, President Alija Izetbegović appealed directly to the 
American government for “American bombing of the gun positions. Aerial bombing would be the 
right solution. Let them bomb those who are bombing us. That would probably be enough.”55 
However, the United States remained reluctant to use force in BiH notwithstanding the Bosnian 
appeals. President Bush announced that “American troops will not be deployed in Bosnia because 
‘we are not the world’s policemen’”.56  Furthermore, Secretary of State James Baker reinforced the 
President’s reluctance to militarily intervene in BiH stating that, “If you mean is the United States 
likely to resort to the unilateral use of force to shoot our way into Sarajevo, that is a nonstarter.”57 
Indeed, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler told reporters that, “she knows of no 
‘serious, responsible person in here [the State Department]’ who had even discussed military 
intervention’” adding that “We have a totally clear conscience.”58 Rather, American policy was, as 
stated by former United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman, “to get Milosevic 
[sic] to change his mind or, if he doesn’t, to get the Serbian people to put the kind of pressure on 
him to cause him to change his mind.”59 Economic and political pressure remained the American 
modus operandi. 
Keen to capitalise on resolution 758, the UN moved quickly to establish a peacekeeping 
force at the airport and dispatched UNPROFOR Commander General Lewis Mackenzie to 
Sarajevo. Shortly following the General’s arrival, an unknown group attacked the convoy that was 
escorting him through Sarajevo, leaving one French peacekeeper seriously injured.60 The Quai 
condemned the attack adding that, “It is up to all parties concerned to respect the decisions of the 
Security Council and in particular to ensure the proper conduct of the mission of UN observers 
at the airport in Sarajevo and in Sarajevo in general.”61 Undeterred, France dispatched 50 soldiers 
to Sarajevo on 11 June to assist in the first phase of securing the airport as Lewis Mackenzie began 
negotiations with the warring parties.62  
  
In spite of difficulties, Mackenzie was able to negotiate a ceasefire, which would come into 
effect at 06h00 on 15 June, and the dispatch of a thirty-man reconnaissance team to the airport. 
Once there, the reconnaissance team found the airport to be in a surprisingly serviceable condition, 
although much of the heavy plant was damaged or missing.63 Optimistically, Mackenzie asked to 
install a fifty-man mission in the airport on 17 June to “help satisfy the mounting pressure that we 
[UNPROFOR] be seen to be moving quickly to open the airport.”64 Indeed, public pressure 
continued to build on the UN and the need to ‘do something’ was becoming paramount. The 
sudden end of the ceasefire, which collapsed at 05h00 on 17 June, only added to these mounting 
calls.  
An UNPROFOR contingent had been en route from Belgrade to take up residency at the 
airport when artillery fire once more lit up the skies over Sarajevo. Resolutely, Roland Dumas 
declared that, “the action should be continued in Sarajevo despite the difficulties on the ground to 
achieve the liberation of the airport and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.” 65  Similarly 
undeterred, Lord Carrington proposed talks with Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tuđman and Alija 
Izetbegović in Strasbourg on 25 June, whilst UNPROFOR secured an agreement that would allow 
peacekeepers to occupy the airport within days. 66 But, as had become a familiar leitmotif in 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the Serbian party promised one thing, whilst pursuing something quite 
different on the ground. Thus UNPROFOR efforts to reopen the airport were once more 
suspended on 20 June as fighting intensified in the surrounding area.67   
In spite of difficulties, it appeared that the UN-EC combination was making some minor 
yet notable progress. Nonetheless, Europe, as one German official stated, “was still a long way 
from being willing or able to step in with peacekeeping forces, but it could be in a better position 
to tighten sanctions against Serbia”.68 Military intervention remained one option amongst many 
but Europe and the United States remained unprepared to commit troops. Indeed, Germany’s 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel believed that, “Military measures should not be excluded in 
Yugoslavia but I believe it is not a good thing for us Germans to stand in the foreground and 
  
demand them, because German troops will not and should not take part.”69 France remained 
committed to its humanitarianism and continued to deliver aid by road. Indeed, France was the 
only nation that was still successfully delivering aid and one Sarajevan reflected that the French aid 
was “symbolic, given the enormous needs, but important because it shows we are not totally 
abandoned.”70 However, even France’s will was being tested as, following an attack against French 
volunteers, the French government decided to slow its aid programme until fighting abated.71 
The public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy had recently returned from an extended trip to 
the Balkans accompanying an aid delivery by the Lyonnaise NGO Équilibre and immediately set 
about lobbying Mitterrand to strengthen his BiH policy. On 23 June, Lévy arranged a meeting with 
the President that very morning. Over the course of a long discussion, Lévy struggled to engage 
Mitterrand until he compared the fate of Izetbegović with that of the former Chilean President, 
Salvador Allende. The writer thought that he had found in “this well-read man [Izetbegović], this 
man of texts and law, something of Léon Blum or better, an air of Salvador Allende, on the eve of 
the assault on the palace of La Moncada, in the famous photo where he has his miner’s helmet 
and his big glasses.”72 Lévy noticed that this caught the President’s attention. Indeed, Mitterrand 
had previously entertained the idea that a similar fate could befall him as that of the Chilean 
President. 73  Later, Mitterrand would reveal to Roland Dumas that it was Lévy’s personal 
intervention that persuaded him of the need to seize the initiative.74  
Mitterrand was aware that the international mood was building towards a crescendo as the 
fighting in BiH worsened. He was also coming under increasing domestic criticism following 
revelations about his wartime association with the Vichy regime.75 In this context, the President 
held a private conversation with Dumas and revealed that, “I want to strike a decisive blow. I feel 
that it is necessary to change the rhythm and to go off the usual paths of classic diplomacy. I am 
thinking of going to Yugoslavia.”76 Initially, Mitterrand toyed with the idea of going to either 
Belgrade or Sarajevo but Dumas quickly warned the former against such a move. Dumas later told 
Mitterrand that: 
  
 
You cannot start in Belgrade… The critics will come from all sides. We will visit the 
red tyrant, the butcher of Sarajevo. We are continuing to privilege our alliance with 
the Serbs. I can hear certain comments already from the opposition and I read certain 
editorials before they’ve even been written.77 
 
The visit was designed with one eye firmly on media perceptions. To this end, and because of his 
expertise, Mitterrand wanted Kouchner to accompany him but wanted the visit to remain 
absolutely secret until the last possible moment. The President and Foreign Minister would 
continue planning on 26 June in Lisbon at the meeting of the European Council. 
The Lisbon Summit opened as international condemnation of Serbia was reaching a 
crescendo and Sarajevo endured some of the heaviest bombardment it had experienced 
theretofore. The American Secretary of State called on European leaders to “kick Yugoslavia out 
of all international organisations.”78 The United States had, in the preceding days, become more 
willing to consider taking part in a multilateral relief effort. Baker stated that, “No one is talking 
about us trying to solve the Yugoslav civil war. The United States’ objective here is humanitarian 
relief.”79 Indeed, Bush administration officials revealed that, in making the statement, “one of 
Baker’s objectives was to begin conditioning the American public and Congress to the idea of 
American forces taking part in United Nations relief operations in Bosnia.”80 Furthermore, NATO 
commanders suggested that they “already had a mandate for intervention” and “it was better 
placed than any other organisation to put together an appropriate multinational force.”81 However, 
any plans they had were limited “safeguarding a humanitarian airlift.”82 Notwithstanding, Bush’s 
National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, cautioned that “no action is imminent”.83 France still 
had time to shape the international response to events in BiH. 
Boutros-Ghali issued an ultimatum to the Serbs calling for the end of hostilities and the 
relinquishing of heavy weapons by Monday 29 June. If they failed to do so, then the UNSC would 
  
meet to determine the best means to ensure that the civilian population of Sarajevo received aid 
and relief. Over the course of the weekend, President Bush began consultations with European 
allies over “forming an international military coalition to break the blockade and deliver 
humanitarian aid to the Bosnian capital”.84 Diplomats at the UN even went so far as to suggest 
that military action could be forthcoming.85 One option that was being considered was for the UN 
to authorise member countries to drop relief supplies in the Bosnian capital with support from the 
United States Air Force. However, one diplomat concluded that, “There will be no drafting of 
invasion notices over the weekend.”86 Washington remained eager for the Europeans or the United 
Nations “to appear to be taking the lead, arguing that this is a strictly European matter.” 87 
Nonetheless, with the potential for a significant NATO involvement, it was important for France 
to shape any military action in support of its doctrine of military-humanitarianism.  
In support of striking his “decisive blow”, Mitterrand designated the Serbs as the main 
aggressors for the first time in the conflict and stated that, “Serbia is the aggressor today, even if 
the origins of the conflict are far deeper.”88 With Denmark having rejected the Maastricht Treaty 
in a referendum on 2 June, and with France due to hold its own in September, Mitterrand warned 
that the Bosnian crisis had brought the credibility of the European Council into question and that, 
if a solution was not found quickly, it could negatively impact on the ratification of Maastricht.89 
With the European project at stake, the French President sought to provide European leadership 
and called for his partners to put their military means at the disposal of the UN.90 The British 
Prime Minister, John Major, supported Mitterrand’s call and proposed that all member states 
should offer support for the humanitarian airlift.91 A European consensus had coalesced around 
securing the opening of the airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
As the European leaders continued discussing Yugoslavia in the afternoon, Mitterrand 
began to prepare the ground for his latest initiative. In the meeting, he passed Dumas a piece of 
paper outlining his plans for the trip to Sarajevo. He told his Foreign Minister to pay particular 
attention to media relations whilst preparing the operation. The President wanted Paris Match 
  
photographer Claude Azoulay to document the trip alongside a journalist from Agence France 
Presse.92 In alerting international figures and organisations, Dumas continued to suggested that he 
would be making the trip to the besieged capital himself.  
The following morning, Bernard Kouchner arrived in Lisbon and was briefed by Dumas: 
 
We are leaving for Sarajevo today, you and me. You know the terrain, you know the 
access: prepare our voyage. It will make a small noise. Our partners in the Twelve do 
not know but France cannot allow the situation to worsen.93 
 
In preparing for the trip, Dumas and Kouchner spoke to UNPROFOR members, ambassadors 
and politicians, all of whom were under the impression that it was the Foreign Minister, and not 
the President, who would be taking the trip. All warned that the visit was very dangerous and they 
sought to deter Dumas. Slobodan Milošević warned that: 
 
It’s dangerous. Therefore go through Belgrade. There, we one hundred per cent 
guarantee your safety… A helicopter will take and bring you back from Sarajevo 
without difficulty. You are not obliged to see us, or even greet us. I understand the 
idea of your mission.94 
 
.  
Following the final session of the Lisbon Summit, Mitterrand held a short press conference 
where he was keen to outline that his forcefulness did not infer inevitable military intervention. 
Asked whether Europe was going to be able to assert itself in settling the Yugoslav crisis, the 
President responded that the Community “does not have the competence to order foreign policy 
actions that could have military actions.”95 Nonetheless, Mitterrand hinted that an initiative was 
forthcoming, stating that, “the impossibility of delivering humanitarian resources in Sarajevo 
  
especially, creates a moral obligation, dare I say, beyond law (hors textes).”96 The President was 
determined to go beyond diplomatic norms to secure humanitarian aid for the Sarajevan 
population, but equally to secure European hegemony over European security.97 As such, and in 
the spirit of Franco-German leadership, in the corridor outside the conference room Mitterrand 
informed Kohl that the President himself was about to take an initiative.98  
A European solution still seemed achievable as the European Council stated in its resultant 
declaration that it welcomed the study being carried out by the WEU of “possible means in support 
of actions undertaken in the framework of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.”99 In its 
Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers had already reaffirmed its 
commitment to strengthening the WEU’s operational role and stated that, “military units of WEU 
member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and 
rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacekeeping.”100  In the summer of 1992, Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture was still 
in a state of flux and, in order to secure French international influence, Mitterrand needed to act. 
When Dumas informed Kouchner that it was in fact the President who would be taking the trip 
to Sarajevo, he revealed that the trip was intended to “Demonstrate that whilst Europe is 
powerless, France is taking the initiative.” 101  The President was hoping to secure France’s 
international role in the post-Cold War world. 
As the President’s party prepared to leave Lisbon, the initiative was, in a number of ways, 
still in the planning stage. The President’s entourage totalled eleven people.102 From the jet that 
would transport the group, Kouchner called Mackenzie in Sarajevo and informed him that the 
President was travelling to the besieged capital. A shocked General responded: “My God! Do you 
know the date? ... You French are mad!”103 Quickly the word spread amongst a thrilled French 
contingent that the President intended to land in Sarajevo that evening. However, the airport, and 
the city itself, were not prepared for the visit of a Head of State and Mackenzie tried to persuade 
the President and his entourage to delay their landing until the morning. However, Mitterrand 
  
remained determined to land that evening and Mackenzie decided, rather than have the “President 
of France splattered over a mountainside beside the runway”, to negotiate a cessation of hostilities 
between the government forces and the Bosnian Serbs. 104 However, fortunately for Mackeznie, 
the pilots aborted their landing in Sarajevo citing cloud cover, and diverted to Split, where the 
French Ambassador to Croatia, Georges-Marie Chénu had made alternative arrangements. 
Given that the visit was formulated with one eye firmly fixed on media perceptions, and 
he still hoped to maintain an open channel to Belgrade, the President did not want to meet with 
the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman whilst he was in Croatia. So, rather than stay in Tito’s 
former residence in Split, which would have represented a compromise with the Tuđman state, 
the President stayed in the Hotel Bellevue.105 Nonetheless, Mitterrand spoke with his Croatian 
counterpart by telephone and in the evening he dined with Croatian Foreign Minister Zdenko 
Škrabalo and Hrvoje Šarinić, head of Tuđman’s personal office and a dual citizen of France and 
Croatia. 106   
In Paris, Dumas continued to monitor the President’s progress as the Foreign Ministry 
publicly announced Mitterrand’s initiative. The Spokesman for the Élysée, Jean Musitelli, was 
surprised by the initiative and had to return to work that evening to deal with the flow of media 
information.107 Musitelli confirmed that Mitterrand “was not bearing a message” for his European 
partners, “but this approach is to be situated within the logic of the European Council.”108 Slowly 
a trickle of information, coming largely form the AFP journalist Véronique Decoudu, revealed that 
the President was travelling to Sarajevo to “make a symbolic gesture to draw international attention 
to this part of Europe, which is ravaged by war” and to “contribute to the end of the Siege of 
Sarajevo and the reopening of its airport.”109 The Foreign Minister sent a message to Helmut Kohl 
to inform the German Chancellor that, following the two Heads of State’s earlier conversation, 
Mitterrand had decided to go to Sarajevo. Dumas also spoke with the Yugoslav Minister of 
Defence, Života Panić, to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would disengage their forces surrounding 
the airport.110  
  
The President’s party left Split aboard Dauphin and Super Puma helicopters at 09h30 and 
arrived in Sarajevo little over an hour later. The Super Puma was hit by a single round of machine 
gun fire. 111  The Bosnian-Croat politician, Stjepan Kljuić, who had remained loyal to the 
Izetbegović government, later revealed to Chénu that a number of Bosniaks had fired rounds at 
the time of the President’s landing to deter him from coming to Sarajevo; they were convinced 
that he had gone to Sarajevo to prevent military intervention.112 
At the airport, they were welcomed by Mackenzie and French peacekeepers from the 153rd 
Infantry Regiment.113 Surrounded by journalists, Kouchner helped the aging and ailing President 
down from the Dauphin and declared “Mission accomplished, the airport is reopened!”114 The 
President saluted the French troops and shared a few words with them before climbing into an 
official car to take him to the UNPROFOR Headquarters in the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph 
(PTT) building – north-east of the airport and south of Sarajevo’s Miljacka River. It was soon 
decided to transfer the President to an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), for safety. By reaching 
the PTT building, Mackenzie declared that the President had created the first humanitarian 
corridor between the airport and the city.115 Already the President’s visit was achieving notable 
successes in support of his BiH policy. 
In his meeting with Mitterrand, Mackenzie relayed his personal assessment of the conflict, 
stressing that whilst the Serbs bore the majority of the responsibility, certain amounts of blame 
could also be attributed to the government side. He thought that it was in Izetbegović’s interests 
to keep fighting “in the hope that the world will come to his rescue–provided he can make it look 
as if the Serbs are solely responsible for perpetrating the chaos.”116 To this end, Mackenzie relayed 
the information that, “some really horrifying acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually 
orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of an international 
audience.”117 The Canadian General asked Mitterrand to hold a meeting with the Bosnian Serbs 
and not only with Izetbegović, as had originally been intended. After deliberations with Kouchner, 
Mitterrand reluctantly agreed, notwithstanding the harm that the meeting may do to his already 
  
diminishing popularity in France. 118  The Canadian General had one further request for the 
President: to ask Izetbegović to “Stop the harassment of federal [JNA] forces at the airport” so 
that “the agreement [the reopening of the airport] can be applied.”119 However, this was a sensible 
strategy for the Bosnian government: allowing the airport to be reopened would resign BiH to 
accepting humanitarian intervention as the international community’s modus operandi, and would 
preclude the more robust American intervention the Bosnian government hoped for.  
At 11h30, the French President was escorted along Sarajevo’s devastated east-west 
highway to the Presidency building where he was greeted by his Bosnian counterpart, Alija 
Izetbegović, before the two went inside for a meeting that lasted just over an hour.120 The French 
President would later face fierce polemics – following the exposure of the concentration camps in 
BiH and the publication of Bernard-Henri Lévy’s Le lys et la cendre– for a number of revelations 
that Izetbegović supposedly shared with his French counterpart during their tête-à-tête. During the 
conversation, which was conducted through a translator, Mitterrand made no promises beyond 
offering humanitarian intervention and reaffirming his desire to see peace.121 The French President 
told Izetbegović: 
 
We hope that you are going to help us reopen the airport. As soon as it is liberated 
and put under UN control, you must do all you can to avoid Bosniak soldiers 
occupying it. That would risk turning international opinion [against you] that supports 
you. This is a piece of advice that I am giving you… The UN is waiting for this opening 
to deliver humanitarian aid. Then it can return to diplomacy.122 
 
In 1993, Izetbegović recalled two significant features of the meeting: that he had requested direct 
military intervention and that he had provided Mitterrand with proof of the existence of a network 
of concentration camps.123 However, whilst Izetbegović thought that the international community 
needed to go further than merely reopening the airport, he did not demand direct military 
  
intervention but suggested that it was necessary. Mitterrand urged patience ahead of the end of the 
UN’s forty-eight hour ultimatum, and repeated that, after its expiration, the European Council was 
willing to consider military action under UN auspices.124 Similarly, Izetbegović recalled that he was 
sure that he “spoke to him [Mitterrand] about the concentration camps and… waited for his on-
the-spot reaction when he returned to France.”125 Although Izetbegović went to great lengths to 
explain the suffering of the Bosnian population, and the harrowing and systematic process of 
ethnic cleansing, he provided no proof of a network of concentration camps per se.126 Throughout 
Izetbegović’s moving account, Mitterrand remained straight-faced. The French President’s 
objectives were fixed – reopen the airport and secure the delivery of humanitarian aid – and he 
remained committed to achieving these alone.  
The two presidents then began a brief tour of central Sarajevo by foot. Firstly, they walked 
to the nearby Koševo Hospital. En route, Izetbegović explained to Kouchner that, “Women are 
deported after having been raped, and they are directing innocent men, civilians, unarmed to 
extermination camps.”127 Although Kouchner rejected the idea that there were extermination 
camps in BiH, he “promised, with the approval of the President, to try to open the camps.”128 
Nonetheless, the dilapidated conditions of the nearby municipal hospital would have reinforced 
the appalling conditions in Sarajevo and BiH. 129In these surroundings, the French President 
moved amongst the hospital’s patients and comforted them, holding their hands.  
The presidents and their parties then left the hospital and walked towards the bakery on 
Vaso Miskin Street (present day Ferhadija), where, a month prior, the shelling of a breadline had 
left sixteen people dead and tens more injured. En route, the President was greeted with cheers of 
“Mitterrand, you are our last hope!”, “Mitterrand, Bosnia!” and “Thank you for your courage!”130 
When he reached the bakery, Mitterrand laid a single red rose to the memory of the victims. For 
him, the red rose was a potent symbol and one that he had cultivated since the early 1970s.131  
The two Heads of State returned to the Presidency for their final engagements. Mitterrand 
met the Bosnian government before “a simple meal” of soup and some meat.132 As shells fell 
  
around the Presidency, Mitterrand was then awarded honorary citizenship of Sarajevo before the 
two presidents held a joint press conference. 133 In front of the assembled press, the French 
President underlined the symbolic and humanitarian character of his visit and stated that its 
purpose was “not to wage war with anyone but to protect the aid convoys for suffering peoples” 
and that the population “cannot wait for the deliberations of the great powers.”134 The French 
President was also keen to reinforce that, notwithstanding the EC designating the Serbs as the 
aggressors, “France is not the enemy of any of the republics of the region.”135 In fact, he stressed 
that the traditional relationship between France and Serbia made him “all the more free to say that 
this [the siege] is not acceptable.”136 As Mitterrand left the Presidency, he was handed a lily – the 
flower that adorned the Bosnian national flag, but which symbolically was also the flower of the 
historic French monarchy – by a Sarajevan woman. As he prepared to leave, the President clattered 
his head on the APC that was waiting to take him to the airport. In the back of the vehicle, 
alongside Kouchner, the President mindfully inhaled the scent of the lily to regain his composure 
ahead of his impending meeting with the Bosnian Serb leaders.137 
The French party was greeted at the airport by Nikola Koljević, Ratko Mladić and Radovan 
Karadžić, who revealed that they were preparing to hand over control of the airport to the UN. 
As the group walked inside, fighting erupted in the surrounding area and the Bosnian Serb troops 
fired in the direction of Dobrinja. It became clear that the fighting would ensure the meeting would 
last as long as the Bosnian Serbs desired, which General Mackenzie had warned of earlier in the 
day.138 However, the exchange between the French delegation and their Bosnian Serb counterparts 
was rather curt. Karadžić and Mladić launched into their tired tropes about Islamic fundamentalism 
and the threat that it posed to Europe, which left Mitterrand unimpressed. The nearby fighting 
also made the President agitated and keen to bring the conversation to an end. Karadžić reasoned 
that the Bosnian Serbs had the right to establish their own independent territory in BiH. Mitterrand 
responded, “Perhaps, but you are going about it the wrong way.”139 A rattled Karadžić replied, 
“You pity yourselves, but for every Bosniak death, there are one hundred Serb deaths that you 
  
ignore!”140 Kouchner recalled that Mitterrand looked Karadžić directly in the eye and responded, 
“You are making fun of me and you are speaking nonsense. You are losing your cause. I do not 
believe you.”141 The Bosnian Serbs retorted, “You see, Monsieur le Président, they are shooting at 
us.”142 The French President argued that, “If you were not here, they would not shoot at you” 
before promptly leaving the meeting.143 
Before leaving, Mitterrand quickly spoke to Mackenzie to offer further French assistance. 
The Canadian requested that French humanitarian transporters land at the airport as soon as 
possible to secure its handover and also for a deployment of French marine commandos to fortify 
the UN’s presence at the airport. The President gently nodded and walked away.144 Surrounded by 
members of his security team, UNPROFOR members, and his party, the President walked out to 
the waiting Dauphin helicopter, which left Sarajevo at 16h45 and headed for Split.145 
Once airborne, Bernard Kouchner sought to convince the President of the necessity of 
more robust intervention, arguing that, “We warned that we would not go all the way! Intervention 
– the word causes fear – it’s prevention!”146 Mitterrand responded arguing that the “right to 
intervene does not exist” and Kouchner replied, “There must be a world leader, Mr President, a 
true standard bearer. Our country is designated by our humanist tradition.”147 With Kouchner 
pleading for intervention, the President responded, “Who? France alone? No. We will not add war 
to war. Only the naïve, liars and some fiery intellectuals can think of that.”148 The visit to Sarajevo 
appeared to strengthen Mitterrand’s belief that the crisis needed to be resolved through 
humanitarian aid in support of political negotiations.  
In France, the President’s visit was greeted with near unanimous praise. The conservative 
newspaper Le Figaro thought that Mitterrand had recaptured French public opinion with panache 
comparing him to “Bonaparte at the bridge of Arcola, Clemenceau in the trenches, de Gaulle 
advancing under fire towards the nave of Notre Dame”.149 The socialist newspaper Libération 
argued that Mitterrand had retaken the initiative in solving the Bosnian crisis, having swam against 
the tide of public opinion in trying to negotiate with Serbia over the preceding months. Moreover, 
  
it noted, the visit would have buoyed Sarajevans as not only was Mitterrand the French President, 
or a member of the Twelve of Europe, France was also one of the Permanent Five of the UNSC.150 
Internationally, reaction was generally positive. German officials appeared to be irked as 
theretofore France had appeared the most reticent to act against Serbian aggression.151 However, 
on the Sunday evening, Mitterrand personally called Helmut Kohl, who did not share the negative 
reaction of his diplomats.152 The German press praised the personal courage of Mitterrand but, 
perhaps still offended over the acrimonious debates over Croatian and Slovenian recognition in 
December 1991, accused him of breaking from a unified European approach; a popular accusation 
of French diplomats of German policy in late 1991. 153  In Great Britain, the press praised 
Mitterrand’s personal courage and Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Minister, saluted “the 
courageous act of an aging French President”, underlining that “nothing in Europe, nor in 
Maastricht, prevents a country from taking such an initiative.”154 
In the short-term, the President’s visit appeared to have brought about the reopening of 
the airport; the declared aim of his visit. Mitterrand called Milošević on 29 June, who told the 
Bosnian Serbs to relinquish control of the airport and accept a deployment of UNPROFOR 
peacekeepers.155 They duly did that afternoon, although as part of the agreement reached with the 
UN, the Bosnian Serbs were required to remove artillery from around the airport, which was a 
slow process.156 To secure the agreement, twenty UNPROFOR observers were placed in the area 
surrounding the airport and a French Transall transport craft landed that evening carrying aid. The 
following morning three more transporters, carrying aid, medicine and equipment to repair the 
airport, landed without incident. 157  Military-humanitarianism had been established as the 
international community’s preferred method for conflict management in BiH. 
In Sarajevo, initial Francophile enthusiasm quickly dissipated as it became clear that the 
President’s visit had fixed humanitarian intervention as the international community’s response. A 
week after the President’s visit, the Bosnian newspaper Oslobođenje bemoaned the humanitarian 
policy of the West, which it thought sought only to deal with the “symptom of the disease”, and 
  
perceptively reflected that Mitterrand sought to use the symbolism of his visit to counter domestic 
criticism but also to demonstrate internationally that Europe could act without American 
interference.158 Izetbegović later recalled that, “Many regret the reopening of the airport and this 
‘humanitarian’ policy of the West, which definitively relegated the struggle for rights, justice and 
laws. Instead, we had a policy of alms imposed on us, which, of course, did not meet our 
expectations.”159 Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross recognised that the war in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina fixed humanitarian issues at “the top of the political agenda,” with “one 
turning point being the visit of French President Mitterrand to Sarajevo at the end of June 1992.”160  
The President’s visit did indeed fix the political agenda as it precipitated a flurry of 
international activity. Lord Carrington once more renewed the ECCY, paying tribute to 
Mitterrand’s “spectacular gesture” and adding that the President’s visit would probably have “a 
very important effect for the population of Sarajevo.”161 In support of reopening the airport, the 
UNSC authorised the deployment of 1,000 more peacekeepers to protect it, and Britain declared 
that it was ready to participate in a humanitarian airlift. 162  The President’s intervention had 
reinvigorated the EC-UN partnership. Thus the EC began its humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo on 
2 July, with five French and one British transporter planes delivering over 600 tonnes of aid and 
material to the Bosnian capital. The UN airlift began in earnest the following day, with nine cargo 
planes landing at Sarajevo and being emptied of the cargo in less than seven minutes.163 It marked 
the beginning of the longest humanitarian airlift in history, which would consist of 21 nations 
flying over 13,000 sorties, delivering 160,000 tons of aid, and evacuating 1,300 Bosnians.164  
 The visit of François Mitterrand to Sarajevo was a pivotal moment in the Bosnian War. In 
organising the sortie at such short notice, the President’s aims, and means for achieving them, were 
limited. Notwithstanding, where the EC-UN partnership had failed in reopening the airport for a 
humanitarian airlift, Mitterrand succeeded by sheer dint of will and the prestige attached to the 
highest office in France.  The President fixed military-humanitarianism as the international 
community’s modus operandi and ensured that subsequent initiatives for BiH bore the hallmarks of 
  
France’s post-Cold War security strategy. In doing so the President prevented a NATO-led 
initiative in Yugoslavia and ensured that France would ‘maintain its position’ (‘tenir son rang’) in the 
highest international forums during a dynamic period of history. But the implementation of 
France’s humanitarianism also prevented direct military intervention in BiH. The President 
repeatedly stated that he would not “add war to war” (“ajouter la guerre à la guerre”) and by fixing the 
praxis of military-humanitarianism in BiH, France was able to prevent the march towards war that 
the President thought would “create a widespread guerrilla war in the Balkans.”165  
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